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Magdalena KASTNER. Plalnllff 
and Respondent, 
v. 
LOS ANGELES METROPOLITAN TRANS-
IT AUTHORITY el al.. Oelend-
ants and Appellants. 
L. A. 28382. 
Supreme COUlt of California, 
In Bank. 
June 28, 1965. 
Action against transit authority and bus 
driver for wrongful death of pedestrian who 
was struck by bus. The Superior Coltrt, Los 
Angeles County, Laurence J. Rittenband, J., 
entered a judgment ill favor of the plaintiff 
and the transit company and bus driver ap-
pealed. "!"he Supreme Court, McComb, J" 
held that evidence was sufficient to sustain 
finding of negligence of bus driver who 
struck pedestrian,- who was standing, ac-
cording to some testimony, in crosswalk at 
intersection when struck by bus which was 
turning left at intersection during a hard 
rain at night and testimony of traffic officer 
as to point of impact was admissible even 
though opinion ,vas based in part on driver's 
statement to officer. 
Affirmed. 
I. Automobiles e:::>244(6) 
Evidence sustained finding of negti-
{{cnce on part of transit authority and bus 
dri"er who 'vas operating. bus during -hard 
rain at night and fatally injured pedestrian 
who was struck while standing~ according 
to some testimony, in crosswalk as bus driv-
cr was making a left turn at intersection. 
2. Evidence ~548, 552 
In proper case, expert can give his opin-
ion whether he bases such opinion on -facts 
prcsented in hypothetical question or on 
facts he observed for himself, and key 
question is whether or not subject is one 
permitting expert testimony, not sourCe of 
facts on which opinion is predicated. 
403 P.2d-25 
3. Eyldence ~S07, 508 
Expert testimony is admissible or not 
dependent upon whether subject matter is 
within common experience or whether it is 
a special field where opinion of one of skill 
and experience would be of greater validity 
than that of ordinary juryman. 
4. Eyldence ~519 
In field of automobile accidents much 
must be Ie ft to common sense and discretion 
of trial court with respect to whether traffic 
officer, an expert in investigating accidents, 
should be allowed to express an expert opin-
ion as to point of impact. 
5. Evidence 0$=>550(1), 552 
Expert may, in any case proper for re-
ception of expert testimony, give his opin-
ion although he did not personally observe 
facts, and bases his opinion on facts testified 
to by' other witnesses and included in hypo-
thetical questions put to him. 
6. Eyldence ~508 
If case is one for expert testimony, this 
is so not because expert has witnessed the 
facts, but because he is qualified by reason 
of his special knowledge to form an opinion 
on facts while ordinary juror is not. 
7. Evidence ¢::::IS19, 555 
'\There point at which bus struck pedes-
trian was not so obvious that any person, 
trained or not, could infer from evidence 
where it was located, court properly ad-
mitted expert testimony of traffic officer who 
based his conclusions in part on statement 
given by bus driver to officer. 
8. Evidence 0$=>555 
Opinion evidence based on hearsay is 
admissible. 
9. Evidence 0$=>550(1) 
Traffic officer's opinion testimony as to 
point of impact, although based to large 
extent on defendant driver's statement to 
officer, was not based on hearsay where driv-
er testified to the identical facts which were 
included in his statement. 
10. Trial <$=>235(7) 
Trial court properly instructed jurors 
that they were to give traffic officer's opinion 
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as to point of impact between bus and pedes. 
trian only the weight to which they deemed 
it entitled and that they could reject it if 
in their judgment the reasons given for it 
were unsound. 
II. Automobiles *'>246(60) 
Court did not err in instructing jury 
that law presumed that pedestrian fatalJy 
struck by bus had been exercising ordinary 
care in manner in which he was crossing 
intersection at time of accident, that he was 
crossing intersection within marked pedes. 
trian crosswalk and that if a conflict in 
evidence existed it was the jury's duty to 
weigh presumption and any evidence which 
may support it against contrary evidence. 
West's Ann.Code Civ.Proc. § 1%3, subds. I, 
33. 
David H. Olson, Harry M. Hunt and Vic-
tor Rosenblatt, Los Angeles, for defendants 
and appellants. 
Gibson, Dunn &: Crutcher and G. Edward 
Fitzgerald, Los Angeles, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
McCOMB, Justice. 
Defendants appeal from a judgment' in 
favor of plaintiff, after trial before a jury, 
in an action to recover damages for wrong-
ful death. 
Facts: Plaintiff is the widow of Paul 
Kastner, who died as the result of injuries 
sustained in a bus-pedestrian accident on 
January 5, 1959, at approximately 10 p. m., 
at the intersection of Crenshaw Boulevard 
and Florence Avenue in the City of Los 
Angeles. 
At the time of the accident, defendant 
Neal was operating the bus as an employee 
of defendant Los Angeles Metropolitan 
Transit Authority and was acting within the 
course and scope of his employment. 
Questions: First. Was there substantial 
evidence to sustain the verdict! 
Yes. Defendant Neal testified, as fol-
lows: 
Immediately before the accident, he was 
proceeding in a southerly direction on Cren-
shaw Boulevard in the lane next to the 
center of the street When he was about 
50 to 75 feet north of the crosswalk at the 
intersection of Crenshaw Boulevard and 
Florence Avenue, the signal turned to green 
for traffic on Crenshaw. 
At that time, he saw two northbound cars. 
After they had passed him, he made a left 
turn onto Florence Avenue, accelerating 
from a speed of about two or three miles an 
hour at the point at which he made his turn 
to about five miles an hour at the crosswalk. 
It was raining very hard. There were 
windshield wipers on the front windows, 
and he could see for a distance of hal f a 
block in front of the bus. If he looked di-
rectly out the side windows, he could see 
across the street. The windows on the 
sides were livery heavy [sic] covered with 
rain, probably some mud and filrn." 
The vehicle was approximately 35 feet 
long j and when he turned and went through 
the easterly crosswalk, the right front of 
the vehicle was in the curb lane on Florence 
Avenue and the left rear in the second lane. 
He did not hear any sound of an unusual 
nature until his vehicle was uapproxirnateIy 
straightened out going towards the curb at 
approxirnately 45-degree angle." At that 
time, the speed of the vehicle was approxi-
rnately 12 miles an hour, and the front end 
of the bus was approximately 30 feet past 
the east line of the crosswalk. 
What he heard "sounded like something 
had been blown or thrown or knocked into 
the side" of the bus "about the middle be-
tween the front and the rear." He did not 
know whether the contact was on the right 
or the left side. The vehicle proceeded 
about 50 feet further before he brought it 
to a stop. 
He alighted and walked back to a point 
near the middle of the bus. He then saw 
in the street an object which he determined 
to be a man's body. The body was "approxi_ 
mately between 15 and 18-20 fe~t" east of 
the east line of the crosswalk and Ifapproxi_ 
mately 12 or 14 feet" north of the curb line 
on Florence Avenue. He later walked 
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around the bus twice, but observed no un .. 
usual marks on the road film on the bus. He 
did not, however J use a flashlight in making 
his observations. 
Defendant Neal admitted that at the 
coroner's inquest he had testified that at the 
time he heard the thud the front of the bus 
was past the crosswalk but he could not 
say for sure whether the center of the bus 
was. 
Harry Waggoner, a service station opera-
tor at the southeast corner of Florence and 
Crenshaw, testified that he saw the bus just 
before the accident as it was approaching the 
intersection; that he observed it until it 
was in approximately th~ center of the inter-
section; that the telephone at the service 
station rang, and he ran inside to answer 
it; that he subsequently observed the bus 
after it had made the turn j that he saw a 
reflection of something falling on the left 
side of the bus about three feet back of 
where the driver would sit; that he then saw 
the left rear of the bus rise up and an ob-
ject come shooting out as if it had been 
pushed with a great force approximately 10 
feet to the rear of the bus; and that he ran 
out to the street and Saw the body of a man 
lying seven feet from the south curb of 
Florence Avenue and 20 feet east of the 
crosswalk. 
Stuart Baxter, a police officer, testified as 
to his training and experience in the investi-
gation of traffic accidents, in order to qualify 
as an expert witness j and he was allowed to 
give his opinion as to the point of impact. 
He placed such point in the easterly half of 
the crosswalk approximately 15 feet north 
()f the south Cl1rb of Florence Avenue. 
Officer Baxter testified that he based his 
opinion on the following factors: "The 
travel of the bus in its direction of travel and 
path, crossing the crosswalk, the statement 
• Defendant Neal's statement was, as fol-
lows: ''I was traveling south on Cren-
shaw in the center lane of traffic and was 
making a left-hand tum into Florence 
Avenue when I heard a thud to the rear 
of my bUB. When I heard this thud I 
stopped the bus as quickly as I could 
and upon looking behind the bus I saw 
of the driver, and the marks on the side of 
the bus [disturbances in the road film], the 
path of the bus as described by the driver, 
and his observations of a thud that he had 
heard while he was turning." 
Officer Baxter testified that the disturb-
ances in the road film on the front and side 
of the bus appeared to be recent and to have 
been caused at approximately the time of 
the accident, that they were on the right-
haod corner of the bus and extended to 
about the right front wheel, and that in his 
opinion they were uconnected with the 
pedestrian and the bus." He admitted, how-
ever, that at the. coroner's inquest he had 
testified that he was unable to determine if 
the marks had been left by the pedestrian. 
Although there were large clots of blood 
at the point where the body came to rest, 
there was no physical evidence in the street 
to indicate the point of impact. 
[1.1 Whether defendant Neal, in the cir-
cumstances related, exercised ordinary care 
in looking for pedestrians Or was negligent 
in failing to see the deceased was purely a 
question of fact for the jury. (Foti v. Mor-
rissey, 57 Ca1.App.2d 328, 331 [1], 134 P.2d 
51 [hearing denied by the Supreme Court]; 
cf. McNear v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 63 
Ca1.App.2d II, 14 [1], 146 P.2d 34 [hear-
ing denied by the Supreme Court].) 
The evidence hereinabove set forth was 
sufficient to sustain the finding of the jury 
that defendants were guilty of negligence. 
Second. Did the court err in admitting 
Ih. opinion I,stimony of Officer Baxter as 
10 Ih, point of impacl' 
. No. Defendants contend that it was not 
proper to allow Officer Baxter to give an 
opinion .on the point of impact, since he 
based his opinion almost entirely on a state-
ment given to him by defendant Neal.' 
the pedestrian lying in the roadway. I 
made a normal left-hand turn and did not 
cut the button when leaving Crenshaw or 
entering Florence. 
"I was turning slow and was almost 
completely turned when I heard the thud. 
I had nearly completed my turn and was 
just starting to right the steering 
----------------------,---------------------------------------
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[2] In a proper case, an expert can give 
. his opinion, whether he bases such opinion 
on facts presented in a hypothetical ques· 
ticn or upon facts he observed for himself. 
The key question is whether or not the sub· 
ject under discussion is one permitting ex-
pert testimony, not the source of the facts 
upon which the opinion is predicated. 
[3] Thus, expert testimony is admis-
sible or not dependent upon whether the 
subj ect matter is within common experience 
or whether it is a special field where the 
opinion of one of skill and experience will 
be of greater validity than that of the 
ordinary juryman. It is quite obvious that 
the conclusion, based upon the facts of the 
particular case, as to just where a collision 
bet\vcen two vehicles occurred, may be so 
obvious that any reasonable person, trained 
or not, can draw that inference from the 
facts. 
[4] It is equally clear that cases may oc~ 
cur where the opinions of trained experts 
in the field on this subject will be of great 
assistance to the members of the jury in ar~ 
riving at their conclusions. In such cases, 
a traffic officer who has spent years investi~ 
gating accidents in which he has been re~ 
qui red to render official reports not only as 
to the facts of the accidents but also as to 
his opinion of their causes, including his 
opinion, where necessary, as to the point of 
impact, is an expert. Necessarily, in this 
field much must be left to the common sense 
and discretion of the trial court. (Zelayeta 
v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, 104 Ca1.App.2d 
716, 724-727 [4--6], 232 P.2d 572.) 
[5,6] The expert in any case proper for 
the reception of expert testimony may give 
his opinion although he did not personally 
observe the facts, basing his opinion upon 
the facts testified to by other witnesses 
and included in hypothetical questions put 
wheel to stl'night<'n' it ont when I h<'nrd 
the thurl. I did not see ony pedestrians 
in the crosswalk when I started turning 
or while I was turnillg. I did not ob-
serve any pedestrinns stunding on the 
southeast corner of the intersection when 
I started turning or while I was turning. 
I did not see any pedestrians in the road-
way before I heard the thuu. 
to him. If the case is one for expert testi-
mony, this is so not because the expert has 
witnessed the facts, but because he is quali~ 
fled by reason of his special knowledge to 
form an opinion on the facts while the Qrdi-
nary juror is not. (Manney v. Housing 
Authority of City of Richmond, 79 Cal.App. 
2d 453, 459-460 [3], 180 P.2d 69 [hearing 
denied by the Supreme Court].) 
[7] In the present case, the point of im-
pact v..'as not so obvious that any person, 
trained or not, could infer from. the evi~ 
dence where it was located. Accordingly, 
the case was one where the opinion of a 
trained expert in the field could be of as~ 
sistance to the members of the jury in ar-
riving' at their conclusions, and the trial 
court properly received opinion evidence by 
a person found to be qualified to testify as 
an expert. 
[8> 9] Opinion evidence based on hca.r~ 
say is inadmissible. (See Jones on Evi~ 
dence (5th ed. 1958) § 421, p. 794.) Officer 
Baxter's opinion, however, although based 
to a large extent upon defendant Neal's 
statement made outside the courtroom, was 
not based upon hearsay evidence, because 
defendant Neal testified on the witness 
stand to the identical facts which were in~ 
eluded in his statement. (See George v. 
Bekins Van & Storage Co., 33 Cal.2d 834, 
&14,205 P.2d 1037.) 
[10] Although under the above rules 
Officer Baxter's opinion was properly re-
ceived in evidence, how much weight it was 
entitled to receive is another matter. The 
trial court, however, properly instructed the 
jurors that they were to give it only the 
weight to which they deemed it entitled, and 
that they could reject it if in their judgment 
the reasons given for it were unsound. 
(See \Vells TT\lCkways, Ltd. v. Cebrian, 
"Xo one identified themselves to me as 
n witness. I was wearing my glasses 
when I was driving. My bus was empty 
when the traffic accident happened and I 
was not intending to pick up at the bus 
stop east of Crenshaw." 
DiltE HALL 
Cite as 403 P .2d S89 
Cal. 389 
122 Ca1.App.2d 666, 677--fJ78 [9-10], 265 
P.2d 557.) 
The following cases, relied on by defend-
ants, are factually distinguishable: 
In Stuart v. Dotts, 89 CaJ.App.2d 683, 201 
P.2d 820, the police officer based his opinion 
on the defendant's statement, which was a 
self-serving declaration and inadmissible 
under the hearsay evidence rule. In addi-
tion, the officer had not been qualified as an 
expert. 
In Ribble v. Cook, 111 Ca1.App.2d 903, 
245 P.2d 593, th~ police officer's opinion 
was ruled to lack proper foundation, be-
cause it was based on the ,self-serving dec-
laration of the defendant and the statement 
of a' witness who did not see the impact, 
which evidence was clearly hearsay. The 
officer's testimony was adjudged almost 
worthless. because it depended on the cred-
ibility of persons other than himself. 
In Kalfus v. Fraze, 136 CaJ.App.2d 415, 
288 P.2d 967, the police officer based his . 
opinion on conversations with the defend-
ant and another witness at the scene of the 
accident Evidence of the defendant's self-
serving declaration and the witness' state-
ment were both inadmissible under the 
hearsay evidence rule. 
In Hodges v. Severns, 201 CaJ.App.2d 99, 
20 Ca1.Rptr. 129~ the police officer who tes-
. tificd was not qualified as an expert witness. 
[11] Third. DUJ the court err in g;' .• 
ing the foUowing instruction? uThe law 
presumes that Paul Kastner, now deceased, 
'Was exercising ordinal,)' care and was obey-
iug the law in the manner in which lie 
crossed the intersection in question, and 
presumes that lie was crossing such inter-
section wit hi,.. the marked pedestrian cross-
walk pro,·ided therefor. Each will .tlpport 
a finding in: accord '<.t'ith the presumption 
where there is no proof to the contra.ry, and 
each wiil support Sftch a finding in the face 
of contraJ'Y evidence, if )'our judgment so 
directs after weighing the conflicting evi-
dence. 
l'W/icn such a conflict exists, it is the 
jur:/s duty to weigh the presumption, and 
any e'tJidence which may support it, agains' 
the contrary evidence, and to determine 
which, if either"preponderates. Such delib-
erations, of course, shall be related to and 
be in accord with my instructions on the 
burden of proof." 
No. The instruction is based on section 
1963, subdivisions 1 and 33, of the Code of 
Civil Procedure and is in accord with two 
decisions o£ this court. (Westberg v. 
Willde, 14 Cal.2d 360, 364-365 [1],94 P.2d 
590; Olsen v. Standard Oil Co., 188 Cal. 
20,24-25 [5], 204 P. 393.) 
The judgment is affirmed. 
PETERS, TOBRINER, PEEK, MOSK, 
and BURKE, JJ., concur. 
TRAYNOR, Chief Justice (concurring). 
I concur in the judgment for the reasons 
stated in my concurring opinion in Brown 
v. Connolly, 62 A.C. 405, 412, 42 Cal.Rptr. 
324, 398 P.2d 596. 
o i K"""'"""'7.""'"o::"7.,,,,,-
, 
45 CaJ.Rptr. 133 
In re Monroe Smith HALL on Habeas Corpus. 
Cr. 8880 • 
Supr('lUC Court of California, 
In Bank. 
.June 30, 1905. 
Habeas corpus proceeding filed on 
ground that state prison inmate was being 
illegally detained. The Superior Court, Los 
Angeles County, David W. Williams, J., 
dismissed petition, and petition was filtd in 
the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, 
McComb, J., held that Adult Authority 
lacked power to add to former parolee's 
term a fugitive time of 19 months repre-
senting time spent in jail pending and dur-
ing trial of murder prosecution, where for-
mer parolee was acquitted of murder 
charge, and other ground for parole sus-
